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Abstract in English 
Even though the Netherlands was the world’s sixth largest exporter in 2009, the majority of 
Dutch firms does not engage in international trade at all, possibly because they are unable to 
cover the costs to enter specific foreign markets. What are these costs that limited the 
internationalisation of Dutch firms? Using detailed and unique transaction-level data on export 
patterns of about 1,200 large Dutch firms in the years 2006-2007, this research opens the black 
box of market entry costs. First, we find that more productive firms are both more likely to 
engage in exports (extensive margin) and to export larger volumes abroad (intensive margin). 
Second, next to the common determinants of export volumes, such as market size, transport and 
trade costs, we find that poorly developed foreign institutions and regulations form important 
impediments to firms’ export decisions, but not to their subsequent export volume decisions. 
We also find some evidence that such effects on the export decision are relatively large in small 
markets, whereas export volumes react more to changes in trade and transport costs in large 
markets.  
 
Key words: heterogeneous firms, export destinations, market entry costs, gravity equations 
JEL code: F14 
Abstract in Dutch 
Nederlandse bedrijven exporteren naar vrijwel alle landen ter wereld. Echter, de meerderheid 
van de Nederlandse bedrijven exporteert helemaal niet, wellicht omdat zij niet in staat zijn de 
kosten voor toetreding tot buitenlandse markten te dekken. Dit onderzoek analyseert de 
exportbeslissingen van bedrijven en de bestemmingskenmerken door gebruik te maken van 
gedetailleerde en unieke handelsstatistieken van de 1200 grootste bedrijven in Nederland in 
2006 en 2007. Eerst laten we zien dat productievere bedrijven vaker (extensieve marge) en ook 
meer exporteren (intensieve marge). Daarnaast blijkt dat naast de gebruikelijke 
handelsbevorderende factoren, zoals marktomvang, transportkosten en tarieven, ook 
institutionele en procedurele belemmeringen bepalend zijn voor de exportbeslissing, maar niet 
voor de exportvolumebeslissing. Tot slot lijken dergelijke effecten op de exportbeslissing 
voornamelijk van belang voor kleine markten, terwijl het effect van handelsbarrières in grote 
landen vooral een effect heeft op exportvolumes.  
 
 
Steekwoorden: heterogene bedrijven exportbestemmingen, markttoetredingskosten, 
graviteitsvergelijking  
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Preface 
In 2009, the Netherlands ranked 6th on the list of exporting countries. Indeed, Dutch firms seem 
to export to nearly every country in the world. However, not all firms export and certainly not 
to every country. Using detailed transaction data from Statistics Netherlands (CBS), this CPB 
Document shows that most large firms export to only a limited number of destinations. Based 
on the recent literature on heterogeneous firms in international economics, the authors explore 
various explanations for this irregular exporting pattern. Distance and market size are important 
explanations for the export pattern but also market entry costs play a prominent role. This 
research digs further into these market entry costs and concludes that low levels of institutional 
and regulatory quality, corruption and cultural dissimilarity are important barriers for entering 
export markets. In particular, the results show that these barriers are especially influential 
regarding firms’ export decision, and not so much regarding the subsequent decision on export 
volumes. 
 
This research is part of the CPB programme Globalisation. The document is written by Roger 
Smeets, Harold Creusen, Arjan Lejour and Henk Kox. It lays down the most important 
theoretical insights from the modern trade literature and documents the most important 
empirical results for the Netherlands. This research is accompanied by a discussion paper in 
which a more technical exercise reveals that the patterns in the data are robust to a number of 
alternative explanations (see Smeets and Creusen, 2010).  
 
The delivery of the international trade statistics of Statistics Netherlands was an essential 
element of this project. The authors thank Statistics Netherlands for their cooperation. The CPB 
programme Globalisation is co-financed by the Dutch Ministries of Economic Affairs, Finance, 
and Social Affairs and Employment. The authors are grateful for comments and constructive 
remarks from policymakers from these ministries, as well as from seminar participants at the 
University of Groningen and Maastricht University. Several CPB colleagues have contributed 
to this project with fruitful comments, in particular Stefan Boeters, Stefan Groot, Hugo Rojas-
Romagosa, Bas Straathof and Bas ter Weel. Discussions with Maarten Bosker, Harry Garretsen, 
Michael Koetter, Bart Los and Marcel Timmer helped to further improve the paper. 
 
Coen Teulings 
Director CPB    8   9 
Summary 
For a small economy, such as the Netherlands, exporting is extremely important for generating 
income. In 2007 exports of goods and services increased to 93% of GDP in the Netherlands. 
The determinants of the size of bilateral trade relations have often been investigated. It is by 
now well known that distance, limited market size and import tariffs hamper trade. However, 
what affects the decision of firms to export in the first place is less well understood. The 
determinants of this decision could be different, and hence so could be implications for trade 
policy. Generally speaking, firms decide both which export markets to serve and how much to 
export to each of them. Yet detailed trade statistics show that the majority of Dutch firms does 
not engage in international trade at all, and those that do only export to a limited number of 
countries. Recent theories in international trade suggest that this might be due to a combination 
of relatively low levels of firm productivity, combined with relatively high costs of foreign 
market entry. Especially for firms that are active in a small and open economy such as the 
Netherlands, establishing new trade relationships could have a significantly larger impact on 
aggregate trade than intensifying existing ones.   
 
In this study, we ask whether market entry costs indeed function as an impediment to exports, 
and whether productivity indeed stimulates exports. Answering these questions is important 
because it sheds light on the determinants of trade relationships. The analysis uncovers several 
determinants of market entry costs, an issue that has not yet received much attention in the 
empirical literature. Specifically, using detailed transaction-level data on the export behaviour 
of Dutch firms, we are able to track the destinations of the exports of approximately 1,200 large 
firms during the years 2006 and 2007. This enables us to investigate patterns in both the export 
decision and export volumes of these firms, and to relate these to firm productivity, as well as 
heterogeneity across destination markets in e.g. country size, transport costs, and institutional 
quality. 
Descriptive results 
There is substantial variation in the number of export markets served by a firm. The average 
number of markets for the firms in our sample is 30 countries. Only a few firms serve more than 
100 export destinations and some 9 percent of the firms export to one destination only. These 
latter firms only account for 0.2 percent of the total exports in our sample. The quarter of firms 
exporting to 50 destinations or more are responsible for 60 percent of the export value. The 
most popular export destinations are Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom, France and 
Switzerland. The top 20 consists of only European countries and the United States. The data 
discriminate between the number of firms serving an export market and the average export 
volume. This shows that Switzerland is important because it is served by many Dutch firms, but 
the United States is a much more important destination in terms of the average export value. In   10 
a similar vain: although about the same number of firms (about 650) exports to Belgium and 
Germany, the latter country is a much more important export destination because the average 
size of exports is nearly twice as high. One of the goals of this document is to understand the 
differences in the number of (large) Dutch firms serving an export market and the average size 
of exports, and to investigate the role of trade policy. 
The extensive and intensive export margin to top 10 Dutch export destinations 
number of firms














































We first discuss the theoretical framework on which our analysis is based. This framework 
predicts that both firms’ export decisions and their export volume decisions are positively 
affected by the market size of an export destination and its remoteness from the rest of the 
world. Variable trade costs, such as transport costs and tariffs, negatively affect these decisions. 
Additionally, the export decision is expected to depend negatively on the existence and extent 
of market entry costs. We present some descriptive evidence, which is consistent with the 
notion that Dutch firms face market entry costs when entering foreign markets. We proceed by 
explaining both the export decision and export volume decision by firm productivity, country 
size, a country’s physical distance from the Netherlands, trade tariffs and various proxies for 
market entry costs. Our methodology accounts for the fact that the export volume decision is 
conditional on a positive export decision. At the same time, it allows us to refrain from making   11 
explicit assumptions a priori about the exact nature and measurement of market entry costs, but 
instead let the data tell us which factors are most likely to function as such. 
Productivity and market entry costs 
Firm productivity is an important determinant of both the export decision and the export volume 
decision. Our estimates suggest that a doubling of productivity would increase the export 
probability to a specific country by 3.4 percentage points, whereas it would increase export 
volumes by 67 percent. This might suggest that productivity increases have a large impact on 
the trade volume and less so on the export decision. However, the average export probability is 
less than 20 percent in our sample. This implies that a 3.4 percentage point increase is still 
substantial. At the country level, market size (measured by GDP) and distance also have a 
significant impact on both export and export volume decisions. A 10 percent increase in size 
(distance) will increase (decrease) the export probability by 1.1 (1.7) percentage points, and 
export volumes by 17 (25) percent.  
 
Productivity and market size are hardly affected by Dutch or European Union trade policy. 
Distance is a proxy for transportation costs and could be affected by better transport facilities 
and a better infrastructure. In the context of our study, trade policy is more relevant for reducing 
market entry costs. We find evidence of the existence of market entry costs and pinpoint some 
of its determinants. Our estimates indicate that the extent of a government’s accountability, the 
quality of its regulation, the degree of corruption, and its cultural proximity to the Netherlands 
all significantly affect the export decision of Dutch firms. However, they do not have any 
discernable impact on the export volume decision, which is in line with the (theoretical) 
interpretation of fixed market entry costs. The effects are economically significant. For 
instance, we find that if Bangladesh (the most corrupt country in our sample) would be able to 
lower its level of corruption to that in Finland (the least corrupt country in our sample), Dutch 
firms would be 8 percentage points more likely to start exporting to Bangladesh, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
Import tariffs only affect the volume of exports. The export decision is not affected but the 
volume of exports increases by about 11 percent if tariffs are lowered by 3 percent. Within the 
EU and for most other industrial export destinations, existing import tariffs are lower than 3 
percent, but for upcoming large economies such as the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) 
countries this is a feasible policy instrument. The number of days it takes to import a container 
of goods also affects the export and export volume decision. In Rwanda this takes 95 days and 
in Denmark only 5. If Rwanda would be able to reduce the time by 90 days, the probability that 
a Dutch firm exports to Rwanda increase by 9 percentage points (which is more than a doubling 
of active Dutch exporters in Rwanda) and the volume of exports by 81 percent.    12 
Differences between large and small markets 
Finally, we find an interesting difference regarding the impact of export barriers between large 
and small countries. Specifically, it appears that a change in export barriers in large countries 
has a stronger effect on the export volume decision relative to the export decision of Dutch 
firms. In small countries this is the other way around. The theoretical model suggests this might 
be due to differences in competition: if competition is stronger in large markets, adjustments in 
exports following a change in export barriers will largely occur in export volumes. The reason 
is that it is relatively unattractive for new exporters to enter the market given the already high 
degree of competition. In small countries, where competition is arguably lower, the opposite 
holds. Our results are consistent with such an explanation. 
Policy implications 
Our analysis enables us to derive policy implications for both export margins: the country-
specific export decision (the so-called extensive margin) and the country-specific export 
volume decision (intensive margin). First, policy makers should recognize that “promoting 
exports” is as such an ambivalent policy goal. Differences between export decisions and export 
volume decisions require different strategies: is the goal of export promotion to stimulate firms 
to engage in exports or to stimulate current exporters to increase their export volumes? If the 
latter is the aim, should already existing trade relationships be intensified, or should new ones 
be established? 
 
Second, once the goals have been made explicit, it should be recognized that the 
appropriateness of policy instruments will depend on the nature of these goals. Decreasing trade 
and transport costs are particularly effective to intensify existing trade relationships. However, 
in order to stimulate firms to engage in exports or exporters to expand to uncharted export 
destinations, it is more appropriate to lower market entry costs, as they are more important 
impediments to the export decision than trade and transport costs. 
 
This touches upon a third implication: traditional trade policies aimed at lowering tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers are less effective in helping new trade relationship to develop. Instead, other 
instruments such as trade missions, bilateral negotiations and economic diplomacy may have a 
larger impact in unlocking new export markets. This is not only a matter of establishing 
business networks and infrastructure for doing business; it also entails pressing for institutional 
and regulatory reforms that make it less risky for Dutch firms to start doing business in foreign 
countries that now provide business opportunities that are too uncertain. The binding rules of 
the internal market in the European Union are the prime example of a mechanism lowering 
these kinds of risks and hence creating and maintaining new export relations. 
   13 
Finally, picking winners and targeting export promotion policies to specific firms or specific 
countries are not likely to be viable policy strategies. We show that being sufficiently 
productive is a prerequisite to survive in foreign markets. Winners need not be picked, they will 
select themselves. Targeted policies might temporarily soften the budget constraints of firms 
that are otherwise incapable of exporting. However, to the extent that such policies cannot be 
sustained long enough to allow firms to reach sufficient scale and productivity, they are not 
likely to generate long term gains. A similar argument extends to promoting exports to specific 
(developing) countries: as long as the proper institutional and regulatory conditions for doing 
business are absent, any temporary export promotion policies targeting specific countries is not 
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1  Introduction 
In 1962, 50 percent of all Dutch goods exports went to Germany, Belgium, United Kingdom 
and France, in that order. After nearly fifty years of economic integration, these four countries 
still form the top four export destinations with an export share of 53 percent.
1 Despite the 
economic boom in Asia over the last decades, the export shares to these countries hardly 
increased. Ongoing efforts to reduce worldwide trade barriers and technological progress have 
led to a steady increase in trade volumes over the last decades, but apparently did not change 
the export destination mix of the Netherlands. This is not only typically Dutch. In a sample of 
158 countries Helpman et al. (2008) document that out of all possible 25 thousand trading pairs, 
55 percent did not exist in 1970. By 1997, this percentage has decreased by a mere 6 percentage 
points to 49 percent. Indeed, the absence of (bilateral) trade is both an important and persistent 
stylized fact of international trade patterns. 
   This suggests that lower trade barriers and improved technology have helped to intensify 
existing trade relations between countries, but have hardly created new ones. Lower trade 
barriers do not seem to be the proper policy instrument to create new trade. If this is indeed the 
case, which policy instruments could be effective for creating new trade relations? 
   This study focuses on the determinants of trade relations by distinguishing export decisions to 
foreign markets and the export volume. The distinction is important because the determinants of 
these decisions differ. The export volume depends on distance, market size, import tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers. Distance and market size are also determining variables in the export 
decision, but this decision also depends on market entry costs. The recent heterogeneous firms 
models of international trade argue that engaging in trade imposes a fixed cost on firms, so that 
only the most productive ones can serve foreign markets.
2 If these fixed costs or market entry 
costs further vary across destinations, some countries will be more easily accessible for 
exporters than others. Firm-level productivity and country-level variations in market entry costs 
together determine the pattern of international trade. As an example of this trade pattern, Figure 
1.1 shows that nine percent of the large Dutch firms serve one export market and only a few 
firms serve more than 100 export markets. 
 
1 Data from Statistics Netherlands.  
2 See e.g., Melitz (2003), Bernard et al. (2003) and Chaney (2008).   16 
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In this study, we investigate the determinants of this trade pattern. Specifically, we ask whether 
market entry costs are an impediment to exports, and whether productivity indeed stimulates 
exports.    
We use detailed data on the export patterns of 1,200 large Dutch firms in 2006 and 2007. 
These data do not only reveal the number of export destinations for Dutch firms but also the 
number of firms serving a particular market and the size of their exports. For instance, we find 
that the United States is ranked fifth in export value but only ninth in terms of the number of 
exporting firms. The reason is that the average firm-level export value is about 18 million, 
exceeding the average export value to France (16.7 million). Why is the number of firms that 
exports to the United States relatively low and the average value of exports relatively high? By 
disentangling the export market entry decision and export volume decision, we are able to 
answer such questions. 
First, combining firm-level and country-level determinants of trade patterns and trade 
volumes, we are able to account for the impact of productivity and trade costs simultaneously.  
Second, using a range of different candidates for market entry costs, our econometric 
methodology lets the data decide which of them actually function as such and which do not.  
Our main results first indicate that the “usual suspects” in determining the magnitude of 
trade flows - country size and distance - are also prominent determinants of the export decision. 
Distance explains why the United States is served by less Dutch firms than neighbouring 
European countries are. However, market size explains why the United States is the only non-
European country in the top twenty of Dutch export destination. It also explains that Asian 
destinations are not very attractive, although rapid economic growth should make Asia more 
popular in the (near) future.   17 
Second, we find that various cultural, institutional and procedural factors - such as cultural 
proximity, the extent of corruption, and the quality of regulation - function only as market entry 
costs, as they affect a firm’s export decision, but not its subsequent export volume decision. 
These factors add to the low number of firms exporting to Asia. Not only distance matters, but 
also the costs of entering the market. China is a typical example of an export destination with 
market access difficulties. China’s growth performance and WTO membership in 2001, 
accompanied by substantial decrease in import tariffs, did not lead to an impressive increase in 
Dutch exports. Exports did increase, but differences in culture and institutions hinder new trade 
relations. This not only holds for Asian export destinations. For example, Dutch firms would be 
9.7 percentage points more likely to export to Iran if that county would have the same quality of 
institutions as Denmark.  
Third, we document an interesting difference of the impact of trade costs on exports 
between large and small countries: Whereas changes in trade costs more strongly affect the 
export volume decision to large export destinations, they affect the export decision somewhat 
stronger for small export destinations.  Finally, productivity also functions as a determinant of 
these two export flow components. 
These findings have several implications for Dutch export promotion policies. First, 
composing effective export promotion policies requires an explicit statement of its goals. That 
is, if the aim is to stimulate non-exporters to engage in exports, reducing foreign market entry 
costs will be more effective than stimulating export volumes of existing exporters. However, 
this also crucially depends on the source of the increased export volumes. Should existing 
exporters export more to their established trade partners, or should they add new markets to 
their export portfolio? In the latter case, decreasing market entry costs in destination countries 
might again be more appropriate than lowering bilateral trade tariffs, whereas the opposite holds 
in the former case. Furthermore, another implication is that trade missions, bilateral 
negotiations and economic diplomacy may have a larger impact than lowering tariffs and non 
tariff barriers, by decreasing information costs and unlocking export markets that are so far 
largely isolated for Dutch firms. Finally, our results also suggest that export promotion policies 
targeted at specific firms or countries are unwarranted. More productive firms will more easily 
engage in exports, and export large volumes when they do. That is, winners need not be picked 
by the government as they will select themselves. Similarly, stimulating exports to a particular 
(isolated) country will not generate sustained trade relationships unless proper institutional and 
regulatory conditions are in place. 
Traditional trade policies, like import tariff and non tariff policies, are delegated to the 
European Union. WTO negotiations and bilateral free trade agreements between the EU and 
countries like Canada and Korea mainly focus on lowering and eliminating import tariffs and 
will thus create trade by intensifying trade of existing exporting firms. Trade missions and 
economic diplomacy could be instruments to unlock potential export markets and could be used 
by the EU and the individual Member States.    18 
EU enlargement is a typical example of creating new trade relations and intensifying 
existing ones. Except for the elimination of import tariffs, the intensified cooperation with these 
countries and acceptance of EU rules lower market entry costs. It is not surprising that Poland is 
in the top ten of Dutch export destinations and that the Czech Republic and Hungary are in the 
top twenty. Moreover, European Neighbourhood policy is also a way of lowering market entry 
costs with the countries east and south of the European Union.  
 This study fits into the recent empirical literature on the relationship between market entry 
costs and trade patterns. Eaton et al. (2004; 2008) analyse the export patterns of French firms 
and find that the number of French firms exporting to a specific market varies positively with 
the size of that market, and that variation in export market destinations is much larger along the 
extensive margin (the number of firms selling there) than the intensive margin (the amount of 
exports per firm). Chevassus-Lozza and Latouche (2009) find that market-specific fixed costs 
matter mostly for the export decision (the extensive margin) but not so much for the amount of 
sales following this decision (the intensive margin). They also show that the market entry costs 
for French agrofood exporters vary significantly across export destinations in Europe, but they 
do not open the black box of the determinants of these market entry costs. Blanes-Cristóbal et 
al. (2008) analyse a representative sample of Spanish firms with three export destinations: the 
EU, the OECD (minus EU) and the rest of the world (RoW). They find a productivity premium 
for the EU destinations but not for the OECD and RoW, which they take as evidence of market 
entry costs in the EU. Finally, for a sample of Irish exporters Lawless (2009) documents a 
positive relationship between firm productivity and the number of export markets served, 
suggesting that fixed entry costs differ per export market. In sum, this body of literature 
provides indirect and implicit evidence on the role of foreign market entry costs. Our goal is to 
provide a more explicit analysis of these costs, by investigating some of their potential 
determinants and their impact on the firm-level country-specific export decision. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the main theoretical 
arguments of the firm heterogeneity model including the export-market heterogeneity in terms 
of fixed export costs. The accompanying model of Chaney (2008) is presented in appendix A. 
Section 3 describes the firm level data and investigates whether some of the model’s 
implications can be observed by simply looking at the stylized facts in the data. Moreover, it 
also presents data at the country level related to market entry costs. Section 4 presents the 
empirical model, the econometric methodology and the estimation results (a formal derivation 
of the model is relegated Appendix B). Finally, Section 5 concludes with policy implications, 
recommendations, and some suggestions for future research. 
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2  Heterogeneous firms and fixed export costs 
In a seminal paper, Melitz (2003) introduces heterogeneous firms that differ from each other in 
terms of productivity into a model of international trade. Next to a fixed cost of domestic 
production, he also introduces a fixed cost of exporting. Together these novelties yield an 
equilibrium in which some firms export, and others do not. Figure 2.1 illustrates the results of 
the underlying mechanism. 
Figure 2.1  Firm heterogeneity and fixed export costs 
 
The horizontal axis in the figure denotes firm productivity (ϕ) and the vertical axis denotes firm 
profits (π). The three curves labelled π depict profits for firms that only serve the domestic 
market (πdomestic), additional profits for firms that also export (πexports), and total profits i.e. the 
sum of domestic and export profits (πtotal). These profits are positively related to productivity, 
because increases in productivity (and hence lower marginal costs) allow the firm to set lower 
prices and capture a bigger share of the market ceteris paribus. Two things stand out: First, the 
intercept of the πdomestic-curve is smaller in absolute value than that of the πexports-curve. This is 
due to the assumption that the fixed costs of exports (FE) are higher than those of domestic 
production (FD). Second, the slope of the πdomestic-curve is steeper than that of the πexports-curve. 
The reason is that exporters incur a variable trade cost on every unit they export, thus lowering 
the marginal increase in profits following a productivity increase, relative to domestic 
production. Together, these elements introduce two threshold productivity levels, ϕD and ϕE, for 
which it holds that ϕE>ϕD. The productivity thresholds represent the minimum level of 
productivity that is needed to engage in either domestic production (ϕD) or exports (ϕE). 
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negative. Firms with productivity levels in between ϕD and ϕE produce for the domestic market 
only, as domestic profits exceed those that could be earned by also engaging in exports. Finally, 
firms with productivity levels above ϕE produce both for the domestic market and engage in 
exports, as this entails the highest total profits. This yields an equilibrium in which there are 
both exporters and non-exporters and exporters are more productive than non-exporters.
3 
The latter implication of the model has been taken to the data by many studies. These try to 
establish whether the productivity of a firm is indeed an important determinant of its export 
decision. Table 2.1 below is (partly) taken from Greenaway and Kneller (2007) and presents the 
results of a number of different studies. The general picture that emerges is that indeed a (ex-
ante) exporter productivity premium exists - both in terms of labour productivity (LP) and total 
factor productivity (TFP) - but that its magnitude varies across countries.
4 
Table 2.1  Exporter productivity premia: empirical evidence 
Study  Sample  Productivity premium 
(ex ante) 
     
Bernard and Jensen (1999)  United States: 1984-1992  6% TFP, 8% LP 
Isgut (2001)  Colombia: 1981-1991  20% LP, 4%  LP 
Wagner (2002)  Germany: 1978-1989  0% LP 
Baldwin and Gu (2003)  Canada: 1974-1996  3%  LP, 0%  TFP 
Hahn (2004)  Korea: 1990-1998  4% TFP 
Blalock and Gertler (2004)  Indonesia: 1990-1996  3% TFP 
Kox and Rojas-Romagosa (2010)  The Netherlands: 1999-2005  6.2% LP 
     
TFP = Total Factor Productivity 
LP = Labour Productivity 
  = change 
Source: Greenaway and Kneller (2007), part of Table 3. 
 
Other studies have extended or adapted the original model of Melitz (2003) theoretically.
5 In 
this paper, we follow a particular extension by Chaney (2008). Chaney (2008) extends Melitz 
(2003) by allowing for asymmetric countries that are separated by asymmetric trade barriers. In 
particular, Melitz (2003) assumes that both fixed and variable trade costs are similar across 
foreign destinations implying that all exporters ship their goods to all possible destinations. This 
implication is at odds with the observation that many countries are still largely isolated from 
world markets (Helpman et al., 2008). It also contradicts some stylized facts of previous firm-
level studies
6 as well as our own results below. By allowing for differences in fixed and 
variable trade costs, as well as country asymmetries in terms of size, Chaney (2008) effectively 
 
3 Additionally, this model uncovers another (macro-level) benefit of international trade, which is the increase in average 
industry-level productivity due to the entry of more productive foreign firms in the market and the simultaneous exit of less 
productive firms. 
4 See e.g., Wagner (2007) and Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) for other overviews of the literature. 
5 See e.g., Melitz and Ottaviano (2008); Chaney (2008); and Akerman and Forslid (2009). 
6 See e.g., Bernard et al. (2007); Mayer and Ottaviano (2007); Eaton et al. (2008); and Lawless (2009).    21 
allows the intercept and slope of the πexports-curve in Figure 2.1 to vary across export 
destinations. As a result, the export productivity threshold ϕE will also differ across countries, 
so that even among exporters, some will serve more markets than others.  
We present a formal derivation of Chaney’s model in Appendix 1. Here we will explain the 
main mechanisms in the model on which we build our empirical specifications in Section 4. A 
firm’s export decision is determined both by its own productivity and the country-specific 
threshold. If we are able to decompose the productivity threshold in observable country-level 
determinants, we can estimate the export decision as a function of firm productivity and these 
country-level determinants. Chaney’s (2008) model reveals that the productivity threshold is a 
positive function of variable and fixed trade costs, and a negative function of the trade partners’ 
market size and its “remoteness” from the rest of the world.
7 
First, consider the role of variable and fixed trade costs. Intuitively, if such costs increase, it 
becomes more difficult for a firm to profitably export its products to a foreign country. In terms 
of Figure 2.1, an increase in fixed costs shifts the intercept of the πexports-curve down; whereas 
an increase in variable costs flattens its slope (i.e. flattens the πexports-curve). This implies that 
the productivity threshold ϕE to serve a foreign country increases with (variable and fixed) trade 
costs.  
Second, the market size of the destination country has an opposite effect on the threshold: if 
market size - and hence foreign demand - increases, this puts an upward pressure on prices. 
Consequently, more productive firms can benefit from higher margins and make large profits 
ceteris paribus. In terms of Figure 2.1, the slope of the πexports-curve increases, hence lowering 
the productivity threshold ϕE. Finally, the “remoteness” of a trade partner also matters: the more 
remote a trade partner is from the rest of the world, the easier it is for firms from one specific 
home country to serve this trade partner ceteris paribus, since competition from other exporters 
is reduced. Again, this leads to an upward shift of the πexports-curve and a decrease in ϕE.  
If the firm has the productivity level to export to a specific market, it then has to decide how 
much to export. As long as productivity is below ϕE, exports are 0. Once productivity reaches 
ϕE, the level of exports jumps up and becomes positive. As we show more formally in 
Appendix 1, the determinants of the export volume decision are very similar to those of the 
export-or-not decision. Specifically, the only difference is that fixed export costs are no longer 
of any importance. Intuitively this makes sense: Once the fixed costs of exports are incurred by 
deciding to serve a particular market, they should not influence the decision on how much to 
export, as they are fixed. On the other hand, firm productivity, variable trade costs, market size 
and remoteness are all determinants of the export volume decision. Specifically, an increase in 
productivity increases exports by making a firm more competitive so that it captures are large 
market share. An increase in market size increases effective demand, and an increase in 
 
7 A country’s remoteness captures the extent to which it is separated from other (potential) trade partners through the 
existence of trade barriers, while also taking into account the economic importance of these (potential) trade partners in 
terms of their market size. See equation (A.9) in Appendix 1 for a formal definition of remoteness.   22 
remoteness decreases competition from other exporters that are based in other countries. In 
contrast, an increase in variable trade costs tends to reduce export volumes as it raises the price 
of exports.  
In sum, both the export-or-not decision (the so-called extensive margin decision), and the 
export volume decision (the so-called intensive margin decision) are positively related to the 
firm’s own productivity, as well as both the size and remoteness of a (potential) export 
destination. They are negatively related to variable trade costs that are incurred when exporting 
to a (potential) export destination. Moreover, the extensive margin decision is also negatively 
influenced by the fixed costs of exports, whereas the intensive margin is insensitive to these 
types of costs. We will investigate these relationships in our empirical setup, discussed in more 
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3  Data and descriptive analysis 
In order to empirically investigate some of the predictions of Chaney’s (2008) model for the 
Netherlands, we need three types of data: data on the export patterns of Dutch firms (notably 
regarding their export destinations), data on firm characteristics (notably on firm productivity), 
and data on export market characteristics. Below we provide some details on the specific data 
and variables that we use, and end with some preliminary descriptive analyses. 
 
3.1  Export patterns 
Our export data are obtained from Statistics Netherlands (CBS) and cover the years 2006 and 
2007. These data stem from customs data and include export transactions of firms, classified by 
product and export destination. Linking them to individual firms thus allows us to observe to 
which countries these firms do and do not export (the extensive margin decision), as well as 
how much they export (the intensive margin decision). 
The dataset covers all commodities, but no services, and export flows are recorded on the 
VAT numbers of firms. The total value of all transactions is similar to the size of commodity 
exports and imports in the national accounts. Statistics Netherlands (2009) links these 
transaction data to individual firms using the general business register (GBR). About 24% of 
the exports in 2007 cannot be linked to firms according to Statistics Netherlands (2009). An 
important reason for this is that a significant part of recorded trade is carried out by foreign 
controlled enterprises without establishments in the Netherlands. These firms are not registered 
in the GBR. Large firms (with more than 250 employees) are responsible for 34% of the 
exports, i.e. 118 billion euro in 2007. The exports of SMEs thus form the major part of total 
exports (42%) but only 8% of the SMEs exports commodities (Statistics Netherlands, 2009).  
In this study, we link these export data to the (approximately) 1,200 largest Dutch firms (i.e. 
firms that are active in the Netherlands, hence not necessarily Dutch owned). We have several 
reasons to consider these large firms only. First, we prefer to have a sample of firms that serve 
multiple and different export markets in order to establish a relationship between the export 
decision and fixed export costs across different export destinations. Most firms - and certainly 
most small firms - only serve one export market (cf. Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007; Bernard et al., 
2007) whereas firms servicing multiple export markets are often large.  
Second, the transaction-level trade data are identified by means of VAT numbers. A 
problem with the VAT identifier is that fiscal laws allow firms within an enterprise group to use 
the same VAT identity. It means that matching the customs-based export data with firm-level 
statistics can be problematic for firms belonging to one fiscal enterprise group. It causes non-
unique matches, because more than one firm may use the same VAT number, so that linking 
export patterns to firm-level characteristics is not straightforward anymore. Since the extent of 
these non-unique matches is limited in the case of large firms (enterprise groups), we prefer to   24 
use export transaction data of large firms instead of small firms as the loss of information is 
minimized.  
Finally, many small firm establishments eventually are part of large firms. Since we assume 
that strategic decision-making for the international expansion strategy of firms takes place at a 
high hierarchical level, we expect that the concept of a large firm will better reflect the level at 
which export decisions are taken.  
3.2  Firm characteristics 
We use firm-level data for the (approximately) 1,200 largest Dutch firms during the years 2006 
and 2007. Dutch firms in this case means firms active in the Netherlands, so they can also be 
(partly or fully) foreign owned. The data are a census and stem from the “Statistiek Financiën 
Grote Ondernemingen” (SFGO), which provides balance-sheet data and profit-and-loss 
accounts of non-financial firms with a balance sheet total of more than 23 million euros. The 
minimum firm size in terms of employment is about 50 employees, but most of the firms in this 
dataset have more than 200 employees. In 2007, some 30% of them had less than 250 
employees and are therefore to be considered as SMEs according to the definition of Statistics 
Netherlands. 
Table 3.1  Data coverage matched dataset (total values) 
                 2006                 2007 
  Total  Matched  %  Total  Matched  % 
             
Number of firms
  1,236  986  79.8  1,210  1,029  85.0 
Employment
1  1,298  824  63.5  1,281  1030  80.4 
Value Added
2  126  96  76.1  129  111  86.0 
Capital Stock
2  184  150  81.5  222  188  84.7 
Exports
2,3  319  98.9  31.0  348  138  39.6 
             
1 In thousands of full-time equivalents. 
2 In billion Euros 
3 Original data is the customs-based export data set. The total value of exports in these data equals the value of commodity exports in 
the national accounts.  
Source: SFGO and IH data of Statistic Netherlands 
 
We have matched the export data described in Section 3.1 to the firms in the SFGO. Table 3.1 
presents some figures regarding the coverage of our matched sample. In general, the coverage 
for 2007 is better than for 2006. In terms of the number of firms and capital stock, the coverage 
of the matched database is about 80%. For employment and value added, at least in 2006 the 
coverage is substantially lower. Finally, note that the coverage in terms of export value is 
relative to the total in the transaction-level trade dataset. Most exports (between 60%-70%) are 
lost after the match because a part of the transaction-level trade data can not be matched and 
another share is conducted by SMEs (cf. Section 3.1 above).    25 
We also note that all estimates reported in Section 4 are based on the sample of manufacturing, 
wholesale and retail firms. The reason is that this gives us a more homogeneous set of firms 
trading commodities, as other service sector firms trade services which are not included in our 
trade data. This selection of firms account for the majority of matched trade volumes (81%). 
We include wholesale and retail firms in this sample because these are responsible for 
approximately 25% of total Dutch exports. Excluding them from the analyses would thus 
seriously reduce the export coverage in our sample (cf. Bernard et al., 2010). 
The model discussion in Section 2 suggests that we need data on inter alia firm 
productivity. We derive a measure of labour productivity from the firm-level data, measured as 
(the log of) value added of employment in full-time equivalents.   
3.3  Country characteristics 
Next to a measure of firm-level productivity, we also need data on various country 
characteristics: market size, variable trade costs, fixed trade costs and remoteness. Even though 
the firms in our sample are active in approximately 165 countries, due to data constraints 
regarding some of the variables discussed below, we eventually end up with a sample of 106 
countries (see Appendix 3 for a list of these). 
For market size, we use (the log of) total GDP from the World Bank Development 
Indicators; the data are converted from US dollars (in constant prices from the year 2000) into 
Euros using an average annual exchange rate. Variable trade costs can be (crudely) decomposed 
into transport costs and trade costs. We follow the gravity-model literature and use the 
geographical distance between Amsterdam and each of the trading partners’ most populated 
cities as a proxy for transport costs. These data are taken from CEPII. For trade costs, we use a 
measure of average country-level import tariffs which is taken from the Fraser Institute 
(Gwartney and Lawson, 2008). Following the theoretical model by Chaney (2008), we 
construct a measure of remoteness for each export country k in the total set of M export 
destinations (i.e. 106), as the inverse of the distance weighted sum of the market sizes of all M-1 
trading partners of k.
8 
Finally, we need a measure of fixed trade costs or market entry costs. Recall from Section 2 
that these costs have an impact on the extensive margin decision, but not on the intensive 
margin decision. This is somewhat problematic, as it is not a priori clear which factor or factors 
satisfy this requirement.  
Kneller and Pisu (2007) shed some light on this issue using new survey data for the UK. 
They have firm-level information on the perceived importance of each barrier to trade. Table 
3.2 reproduces the percentage of firms considering a certain issue as a barrier to export. The 
barriers are grouped in network and marketing barriers, procedural and exchange rate issues and 
cultural barriers. This list shows that cultural differences, regulation and tax systems and 
 
8 See equation (A.9) in Appendix 1 for a formal definition of remoteness that corresponds to this empirical proxy.   26 
information and search costs are serious impediments to trade. The actual numbers are striking 
but could be biased upwards because the authors state themselves that the firms are selected 
from a sample of firms participating in UK export promotion programmes.  
Table 3.2  Barriers to exporting for firms in the UK 
  % of firms identifying this as 
a barrier 
Group 1: Networks and marketing   
Obtaining basic information about an export market   29.8 
Identifying who to make contact with in the first instance  53.7 
Building relationships with key influencers or decision-makers  43.5 
Establishing an initial dialogue with prospective customers or business partners  42.8 
The marketing costs associated with doing business in an overseas market  51.3 
   
Group 2: Procedural en exchange rates   
Dealing with legal, financial and tax regulations and standards overseas  42.2 
Logistical problems  35.0 
Exchange rates an foreign currency  41.7 
   
Group 3: Cultural   
Language barriers  36.5 
Cultural differences (not language)  32.4 
Not having an office or site in an export market  37.2 
Bias or preference on the part of overseas customers for doing business with firms 
established in their own country 
 
45.2 
   
Source: Kneller and Pisu (2007).   
 
In line with these findings, in recent years scholars have become more aware of the relevance of 
the institutional environment for international trade (Linders, 2006). For instance, Kaufmann 
and Wei (1999) and Musila and Sigué (2010) have shown that corruption negatively affects the 
intensity of international trade relations. Anderson and Marcoulier (2002) and WTO (2004), 
among others, have shown that better quality of institutions increases openness and trade. De 
Groot et al. (2004) use the Worldwide Governance indicators of the World Bank to show that 
higher quality of institutions in the origin and destination country have a positive effect on 
trade. Also, trust has been shown to be a fundamental driver of economic transactions. In 
particular, trust between nations is heavily affected by cultural similarities and cultural 
similarities in turn tend to lower trade costs (Guiso et al., 2009).  
Taken together, this literature provides a range of indicators affecting trade and market 
entry. As many of these are often highly correlated, we consider a selection of them in this 
study. We aim to include variables capturing the quality of institutions, the regulatory 
environment, and cultural similarities.  
To capture the quality of institutions we use four different variables. First, we use a 
governance indicator measuring voice and accountability in a foreign country (Kaufman et al.,   27 
2009). The Worldwide Governance indicators are developed by the World Bank for 212 
countries. They cover six dimensions of governance, one of which is voice and accountability. 
This indicator can be considered to measure the quality of a country’s democracy: It captures 
perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and, freedom of media. 
The index ranges between -2.5 (low quality of democracy) and +2.5 (high quality of 
democracy). Second, we use an index of the overall quality of institutions related to doing 
business from the Heritage Foundation. The index comprises a number of sub indicators 
capturing inter alia freedom for doing business, trade, fiscal affairs, monetary matters, 
investment, and finance. It is measured on a scale from 1 (low institutional quality) to 100 (high 
institutional quality). Third, we use a measure regarding the control of corruption, also based on 
the Heritage Foundation, but derived primarily from the Transparency International's 
Corruption Perceptions Index. This index also ranges from 1 (high degree of corruption) to 100 
(low degree of corruption). Finally, we employ measures to capture the extent of intellectual 
property rights protection, taken from the updated Ginarte and Park (1997) dataset. This 
measure ranges from 0 (low IPP) to 5 (high IPP). 
Table 3.3  Market entry cost proxies 
  Average                    Minimum                    Maximum 
    Level  Country  Level  Country 
           
Voice & accountability
1   0.22   – 1.77  Syria  1.53  Norway 
Overall institutional quality
2   62  45  Iran  82   Ireland 
Corruption
2  44  17  Bangladesh  97  Finland 
Intellectual Property Rights
3  3.34  1.87  Bangladesh  4.88  United States 
Quality of regulation
1   0.26  – 1.61  Iran  1.93  Denmark 













Number of days to import
4   30  5  Denmark/US  95  Rwanda 
Cultural proximity
5   55  1  Bangladesh  88  Austria/Ireland 
           
1 Source: Kaufman et. al (2009). 
2 Source: Heritage Foundation (2009). 
3 Source: Ginarte and Park (1997). 
4 Source: Doing business indicators of the World Bank (2009). 
5 Source: KOF institute (2009). Cultural proximity indicators as part of the overall globalisation index. 
 
 
To capture the regulatory environment in a foreign country, we use three different indicators. 
First, we use the World Bank Governance index on the quality of regulation. This captures 
perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development. As before, it ranges from -2.5 
(low regulatory quality) to +2.5 (high regulatory quality). Second, we use two measures from 
the World Bank Doing Business Indicators that more specifically concentrate on bureaucracies   28 
surrounding trade (Djankov et al., 2010). These indicators measure time in days needed to 
import a container of standard goods into a country, as well as the number of documents needed 
for this. Although there is no natural range for these variables, in our data they range between 5 
and 95 (time) and 3 and 20 (documents). 
Finally, to measure cultural similarity we use an indicator from the KOF institute (KOF 
Institute, 2009).
9 It consists of three items. The first is the trade value of books (both imports 
and exports) relative to GDP. This aims to proxy the extent to which beliefs and values move 
across national borders. A second item is the number of McDonald’s restaurants per capita 
located in a country. The number of Ikea establishments per capita is the third item. It ranges 
between 1 (culturally very distant) and 100 (culturally very proximate). Table 3.3 summarizes 
these indicators and shows their average, minimum and maximum values in our sample.  
Table 3.4 presents pair wise correlation coefficients for all the fixed cost indicators. It is 
clear that many of them correlate quite heavily with each other, so that including them 
simultaneously in our empirical model will be problematic. Note that the two Doing Business 
Indicators correlate negatively with all the other proxies, as might be expected.  
Table 3.4  Pairwise correlations market entry costs 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
                 
















         
4. Corruption  0.77  0.88  0.82  1.00         
5. IPR  0.69  0.76  0.65  0.68  1.00       
6. Docs to import  – 0.61  – 0.63  – 0.58  – 0.61  – 0.53  1.00     




















3.4  Descriptive results 
The theory described in Section 2 has a number of implications that, as a first pass, might be 
investigated by considering some descriptive features in the data. This subsection will consider 
two of them. First, we will investigate if there is an indication of the existence of fixed export 
costs by investigating the distribution of firms across the number of export destinations. 
Specifically, we will consider the relationship between the share of exporters, and the number 
 
9 We do not use more standard measures such as the Hofstede dimensions or the GLOBE index because these are 
available only for a limited number of countries. As we derive most of the variation in our data from cross-country 
differences, it is important that we retain as many countries as possible.   29 
of countries that they export to. If fixed export costs exist and if they are country-specific, we 
expect to see a negative relationship between these two. Second, if fixed costs are export-
market specific it could imply a hierarchy in export market destinations. That is, export markets 
that exhibit lower fixed export costs would also require a lower productivity threshold, and 
hence ceteris paribus should be served by more firms. We will consider if we can establish such 
a hierarchy in our data. 
3.4.1  The importance of fixed export costs 
 
The combination of heterogeneity in firm-level productivity and foreign market entry costs 
implies that different firms will serve a different number of markets. Specifically, ranking 
exports markets j,...¸M in such a way that ϕj < ... < ϕM (where ϕ denotes the productivity 
threshold) implies that for two firms 1 and 2, with firm 1 significantly more productive than 
firm 2, it must hold that if firm 1 can profitably serve markets j,...,l, firm 2 can only serve 
markets j,...,k with k < l. In other words, firm 2 is unlikely to serve the markets with the highest 
productivity threshold. 
 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the distribution of firms in our sample with respect 
to the number of markets that they served in 2007 (the data for 2006 give a similar pattern). It is 
clear that there indeed is substantial variation in the number of markets served. Specifically, the 
figure demonstrates a negative (though far from monotonic) relationship between the share of 
exporters on the one hand, and the number of markets that they export to on the other hand. 
This provides credibility to the existence of heterogeneous firms and country-specific export 
costs.  
Only one firm exports to all 165 countries in our sample. With a median of 20 and an 
average of 30 export destinations, the export country-portfolios of the firms in our sample are 
large, e.g. in comparison with the results obtained by Lawless (2009) for Ireland (specifically, 
see her Figure 1, p. 248). The distribution of the number of export countries also differs 
strongly from what has been reported for France and the USA (Eaton et al 2008; Bernard et al., 
2007). As mentioned, this is due to the fact that we only have large Dutch firms in our sample 
and large firms serve on average much more export destinations. Though our sample is not 
representative of all exporting firms we have the advantage that we can potentially exploit a lot 
of variation on the export-country dimension in our analysis. 
Table 3.5 partly presents the information contained in Error! Reference source not found. 
in a different way. It shows the share of exporters that serve a particular number of markets, as 
well as the share of exports and employment that these account for. 
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 Table 3.5  Distribution of firms, exports and employment (%), 2006-2007 
                Number of export destination countries 
Share of  1  2  3  4  5-20 
           
... exporting firms  8.62  5.47  4.16  3.75  28.8 
... export value  0.19  0.39  0.19  0.45  17.8 
... employment  6.11  6.58  6.01  3.45  24.9 
           
Share of    20-30  30-40  40-50  50+ 
           
... exporting firms    11.7  7.68  6.61  23.3 
... export value    5.74  6.69  8.18  60.3 
... employment    9.05  3.16  7.82  34.1 
           
 
As can be seen in the table, about 50% of the exporting firms serves 20 markets or more. A 
quarter of them even exports to more than 50 countries. For the export value, these figures are 
substantially more skewed. Firms exporting to only one country account for less than 0.2% of 
total exports, whereas those exporting to 50 or more countries account for 60% of exports. 
Combined, these figures show that even in this sample of large firms, exports are distributed 
quite unevenly, with a relatively limited number of large exporters (in terms of countries 
served) accounting for the majority of exports. 
3.4.2  Export market hierarchy 
 
Another implication of the theory is that, provided that fixed export costs are country-specific, a 
hierarchy should exist in terms of the attractiveness of different export markets. The countries 
with the lower market entry costs are the most popular ones for the exporters. Table 3.6 ranks 
the 20 most popular export markets in this respect as they appear in our sample. 
Unsurprisingly, the two neighbours of the Netherlands - Germany and Belgium - are also the 
most popular export markets, both in terms of the number of active firms and the total export 
value. The top 20 is populated only by other EU and European countries, with the United States 
and Turkey as the only exceptions. Interestingly, the ranking in terms of the number of active 
firms (the extensive margin) differs from the ranking in terms of total export value, or average 
exports per firm (the intensive margin). For instance, the United States ranks no. 9 on the 
extensive margin, but no. 5 on the intensive margin. Apparently, it is relatively more difficult 
for firms to expand their exports to the United States than it is to expand their exports within the 
United States once they are active there. Such differences hint at the existence of fixed costs of 
exports. 
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Table 3.6       Export market ranking (2007) 
 
Country  Number of firms  Total export value 
(billions)
 
Average exports per firm 
(millions) 
       
Germany  653  30.9  47.3 
Belgium  649  17.1  26.4 
United Kingdom  578  12.6  21.8 
France  578  9.9  16.7 
Switzerland  515  1.8  3.6 
Spain  507  4.4  8.6 
Italy  496  6.3  12.7 
Denmark  484  1.4  2.9 
United States  476  8.6  18.1 
Poland  458  2.2  4.9 
Sweden  458  2.1  4.5 
Austria  429  1.5  3.6 
Norway  429  1.1  2.5 
Finland  401  1.7  4.1 
Czech Republic  398  1.1  2.7 
Hungary  376  0.9  2.4 
Ireland  372  1.1  2.7 
Turkey  371  1.5  4.1 
Portugal  364  0.9  2.4 
Greece  351  1.1  3.3 
 
 
The implication of the theory is not only that a hierarchy of export markets should exist, but 
also that heterogeneous firms should obey this hierarchy when expanding their exports to 
different countries. Eaton et al. (2008) test this implication for French firms, but find that only a 
small share of their sample obeys an export market hierarchy in a strict sense. A similar result is 
obtained by Lawless (2009) for Irish firms.  
Following Eaton et al. (2008) we also test the extent to which firms in our sample obey the 
export market hierarchy as implied by the top 7 countries from Table 3.6. Markets are ordered 
in decreasing popularity, i.e. from 1 (i.e., Germany) to 7 (i.e., Italy). We employ three different 
definitions of hierarchy, each one stricter than the previous one. Results are reported in Table 
3.7. 
First consider the first column (definition 1). Each row in this column shows the number of 
firms serving a particular country of rank k, conditional on them also serving the country that is 
one step higher up in the ranking (k-1). For example, of the 662 firms exporting to Germany in 
2007, 605 also exported to Belgium, of which 543 also exported to the UK, etc. A total number 
of 358 firms in our sample sticks to this definition of export market-hierarchy for the top-7 
countries.   32 
Table 3.7  Number of firms following export market hierarchy (2007) 
Country  Definition 1
1  Definition 2
2  Definition 3
3 
       
Germany  662  25  15 
Belgium  605  23  6 
United Kingdom  543  5  1 
France  517  17  3 
Switzerland  404  13  0 
Spain  373  15  1 
Italy  358  358  0 
       
1 Each row k presents the set of firms that also serve k - 1 
2 Each row k presents the set of firm that also serve k - 1, but no market >k in the top 7 
3 Each row k presents the set of firm that also serve k - 1, but no market >k in the entire sample   
 
However, this definition of export market hierarchy is not particularly strict as it does not 
restrict firms to serve only these k markets and none other (as the model in Section 2.1 would 
imply). The hierarchy definition applied in the second column goes one step further and 
presents the number of firms serving a particular country of rank k, conditional on them also 
serving country of rank k-1 but not country of rank >k of the top-7 countries. Clearly, applying 
this stricter definition of export market hierarchy shows that a much smaller amount of firms 
sticks to this hierarchy.
10 
Finally, we could be even stricter and extend this second definition of export market 
hierarchy to the entire sample of export markets, instead of just the top-7 countries. The third 
column in Table 3.7 presents the number of firms serving a particular country k, conditional on 
them also serving country k-1 but not any other country of rank >k in our sample of export 
destinations. Virtually no firms in our sample stick to this strict definition of hierarchy in their 
export behaviour.
11 This is not surprising. The firms in our sample are active in different 
industries, export different sets of products, and are possibly exposed to different degrees of 
idiosyncrasies. Due to data limitations we are not able to present hierarchy rankings per 
industry or by product, but it could be the case that these orderings would follow a more strict 
hierarchy. 
Taken together, these descriptive analyses are at least partially consistent with the notion 
that firms experience entry market costs or hurdles in their export decision. However, at the 
same time the strong implications on export market hierarchies that follow from the theory in 
Section 2 are not borne out by the data at this level of aggregation. In the next section, we will 




10 The truncation of firms in the final row of column 2 is due to our definition and our choice to restrict our attention to top-7 
export destinations. 
11 Extending the analysis regarding definition 3 beyond the top 7 does not yield any positive numbers for markets further 
down the ranking.   33 
4  Empirical strategy and results 
4.1  Empirical strategy 
The theoretical model by Chaney (2008) that we discussed in Section 2 (and that is derived 
formally in Appendix 1) yields a number of testable predictions. Specifically, the model 
predicts that both the extensive margin of trade (the decision to export or not) and the intensive 
margin of trade (the export volume decision) are positively related to a firm’s own productivity, 
and to a trade partner’s market size and remoteness, and negatively related to variable trade 
costs. Furthermore, the extensive margin of trade is negatively related to fixed trade costs as 
well. 
The distinction between the extensive and intensive trade margins implies that we have to 
estimate two equations: one to explain the decision to export or not, and one to explain the 
decision on export volumes. It is important to realize that the latter decision is conditional on 
the former; only if a firm has decided to engage in exports can it make a subsequent export 
volume decision. Consequently, the second decision is made only by a subset of the firms in our 
sample (i.e. the actual exporters) and we have to account for the implied sample selection in our 
econometric methodology.  
A common way of doing so is to estimate a two-stage Heckman selection model (Heckman, 
1979). In the first-stage, we estimate the extensive margin decision as a function of 
productivity, country size, remoteness, variable trade costs, and fixed trade costs. In the second 
stage, we then use the subset of exporting firms and estimate the intensive margin decision as a 
function of the same determinants minus fixed trade costs. Additionally, in this second stage 
estimation we correct for the fact that we are looking at a specific subset of firms by including a 
variable derived from the first stage equation, which captures the correlation between the two 
decisions.
12 In order to enhance the identification of the coefficient estimates in the second 
stage, it is desirable to include one or more variables in the first stage equation that are not 
included in the second stage. Fortunately, our theoretical model suggests a natural candidate to 
serve as such a variable: fixed trade costs. However, as we indicated above, finding an 
appropriate empirical candidate is not trivial. We use our measure on cultural proximity as a 
baseline proxy for fixed costs. Getting to know a foreign culture and getting acquainted with its 
particular customs and practices is typically regarded as a barrier to trade (Linders, 2006; Guiso 
et al., 2009). However, once sufficient investments have been made in this regard, the returns 
are invariable to the extent of exchange. That is, cultural barriers are a natural measure of fixed 
trade costs. We will further investigate the sensitiveness of the results to this proxy, as well as 
the validity of potential other candidates below. 
 
12 This variable is equal to the inverse Mill’s ratio from the first stage selection model, also known as Heckman’s lambda. It 
captures the correlation between the two error terms of the first and second stage equations. A significant coefficient on this 
variable indicates that the two decisions are indeed correlated and that the correction should indeed be applied.   34 
In Appendix 2 we show explicitly that the theoretical model by Chaney (2008) conveniently 
reduces to a binary choice model regarding the extensive margin decision, which we use as the 
first stage selection equation. As mentioned before, the model establishes a relation between the 
country-by-country export decision (Exp) of firms, a firm's productivity (ϕ), market size (y), 
remoteness (θ), variable trade costs (τ), and fixed trade costs (F). This yields the following 
binary choice model: 
( ) 0 ikt ikt y kt kt kt F k i k t Exp y F ϕ τ θ α α ϕ α α τ α θ α η φ ν = Φ + + + + + + + +   (4.1) 
where i, k, and t index firm¸ country, and time (year) respectively. Exp is a binary 0-1 variable 
which indicates whether firm i exports to country k at time t (1) or not (0). The α’s are the 
coefficients that we aim to estimate, and they measure the impact that a change in each of the 
variables has on the export decision. The function Φ(.) is the cumulative normal distribution 
function, a transformation that assures that the outcome of the RHS in equation (4.1) lies 
between 0 and 1 (as is the case for the dependent variable). It is based on our assumption that 
the idiosyncratic error term in the model is (standard) normally distributed.
13  
The final three terms in (4.1) capture unobserved heterogeneity at the level of the firm (η), 
country (φ) and time (ν). Not accounting for these unobserved effects might bias the coefficient 
estimates. Usually, they are dealt with by including firm, country and time-fixed effects. 
However, because of the nonlinearity in our model
14 it is invalid to include firm-fixed effects 
because of the so-called “incidental parameters problem”, which tends to severely bias the 
coefficient estimates. A similar problem might arise when including country-fixed effects, since 
we have many different export markets in our sample, implying that we would have to estimate 
many additional parameters. On top of this, the fact that we only have two years of observations 
also seriously limits our possibilities, as including country fixed effects would leave almost no 
variation in the country-level variables to identify the coefficients. For these reasons, we 
estimate equation (4.1) using a pooled probit model, while correcting our standard errors for 
clustering at the country level. In Section 4.4 we will investigate the robustness of this choice to 
estimating a Random Effects probit model. As we have only two years of data, we can safely 
omit the unobserved time effect (ν). 
The second stage equation models the export volume decision, conditional on a positive 
first-stage decision (i.e. Expikt = 1 in equation (4.1)): 
0 ikt ikt y kt kt kt ikt ikt Exports y ϕ τ θ λ β β ϕ β β τ β θ β λ ζ = + + + + + +   (4.2) 
 
13 Another possibility is to use the logistic transformation. However, in this case it is not possible to compute the inverse 
Mill’s ratio, which is based on the (standard) normal distribution.  
14 The nonlinearity is induced by the transformation Φ(.). See Appendix 2 for more details.   35 
where Exports is the (log of) total exports by firm i to country k at time t, the RHS variables are 
defined as in (4.1), ζ is an idiosyncratic error term that we assume to be normally distributed, 
and the β’s are the coefficients that we aim to estimate.
15 The variable λ in (4.2) is computed 
after estimating the model in (4.1) and corrects for the fact that the two decisions (on the 
extensive and intensive margin) might be correlated (also see Appendix 2). Specifically, a 
significant coefficient βλ indicates that they are. Again we cluster our standard errors at the 
country-level to correct for possible dependence of observations within specific export markets. 
4.2  Baseline estimates 
Table 4.1 below presents the baseline estimates of models (4.1) and (4.2) in columns 1 and 2 
respectively. First, consider the export decision model in column 1. All variables enter the 
model with the expected signs, but both remoteness and tariffs are not statistically different 
from zero. The coefficient estimate for productivity implies that the likelihood of a positive 
export decision increases by 0.4 percentage points after a 10% increase in firm productivity.
16 
For GDP and distance, these effects are 1.1 and -1.7 percentage points respectively. Regarding 
cultural proximity, the results suggest that if e.g. Bangladesh were to (extremely) westernise its 
culture, the probability of a firm in our sample to export to Bangladesh would increase by 10 
percentage points. Even though these effects may seem small at first sight, the average 
(unconditional) export probability in our sample is approximately 21% and its standard 
deviation is 40.6%.   
Second, consider the intensive margin decision in column 2.
17 All variables except 
remoteness display the expected signs. Remoteness is negative but statistically insignificant, as 
in column 1. The coefficient estimate on productivity suggests that a 10% increase in firm 
productivity increases the export volume with approximately 6.7%. For GDP, distance and 
tariffs, these figures are 17%, -25% and -38% respectively.
18 These effects are substantial, 
especially compared to the extensive margin effects. However, the average of log exports in our 
sample is 12.2 with a standard deviation of 2.91 (i.e. approximately 291%).  Moreover, the 
coefficient estimate on Heckman’s lambda in column 2 is significant, which indicates that the 
extensive and intensive export margin decisions are indeed correlated. The positive sign 
indicates that there are unobserved firm-specific factors or idiosyncracies which simultaneously 
raise the export probability as well as the export volume decision. One could think of 
 
15 Again, we omit firm, country and year effects due to the limited time variation in our data. 
16 Since productivity is measured in logs, a 10% increase in productivity is approximately equal to a 0.1 change in log 
productivity. This corresponds to a 0.0035 (= 0.1 x 0.035) increase in de dependent variable. Since the dependent variable 
ranges between 0 (0%) and 1 (100%), this in turn corresponds to an approximate increase of 0.4 percentage points. Effects 
for other variables can be computed in a similar fashion. 
17 Note that since the dependent variable (export volume) is measured in logs, the coefficients estimates of productivity, 
GDP, distance and remoteness can be interpreted as elasticities. 
18 Note that tariffs is not measured in logs and hence its coefficient estimate should not be interpreted as an elasticity. In 
fact, a 10% increase in tariffs is rather substantial, given the overall standard deviation of 3%. An increase in tariffs of 3% 
corresponds with a decrease in export volume of approximately 11.4% according to column 2 in Table 4.1.   36 
managerial capabilities or a regional economic boom as such unobserved factors that might 
positively influence these decisions simultaneously. 
Table 4.1  Extensive and intensive margins of trade: baseline estimates 
  Extensive margin  Intensive margin 
     




















Cultural proximity  0.001*** 
(.000) 
 
Lambda    1.99*** 
(.581) 
     
(Pseudo) R
2  0.18  0.21 
P_actual  21%  - 
P_predict  16%  - 
No. observations  156,708  32,515 
     
Source: own estimations based on Statistics Netherlands data. Cluster-robust standard errors within parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes 
1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance. Coefficient estimates in column 1 are marginal effects, evaluated at the mean. 
 
It is hard to compare these estimates to earlier research, as not many studies have analyzed 
detailed firm-level trade data in this way. Crozet et al. (2008) come relatively close in a study of 
French firms. For the extensive margin, they report an elasticity of the export decision with 
respect to Total Factor Productivity of 0.15. This is substantially larger than our labour 
productivity estimate of 0.035, but the productivity measures are not comparable.
19 For the 
intensive margin, they do no consider actual firm exports, but rather average firm exports. 
Doing so, they estimate elasticities of 0.96 and -0.67 for GDP and distance respectively. These 
are lower than ours, but the dependent variables and the level of analysis (firms in our case, 
countries in theirs) are not really comparable. Helpman et al. (2008) also provide estimates for 
the intensive margin measured as average bilateral firm exports for a sample of approximately 
160 countries. The elasticity of distance in their baseline estimation is -1.17, which is a bit 
 
19 The impacts of the other extensive margin determinants are difficult to compare because Crozet et al. (2008) do not report 
marginal effects.    37 
closer to our estimate.
20 However, due to differences in dependent variables and levels of 
analyses, these coefficients are difficult to compare to ours. 
4.3  Market entry costs 
In order to investigate the impact of the various market entry costs that we introduced and 
explained in Section 3.3, we add them to the baseline model of Table 4.1 one by one. The 
reason for not adding them simultaneously is that many of these variables are heavily correlated 
(Table 3.4), which could lead to biased estimates. Table 4.2 presents the results. For reasons of 
space, we only report the extensive and intensive margin coefficient estimates of each of the 
market entry costs, while noting that the coefficient estimates of the baseline variables do not 
change notably. 
Table 4.2  Market entry costs 
  Extensive margin  Intensive margin 
     




























     
Source: own estimations based on Statistics Netherlands data. Cluster-robust standard errors within parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes 
1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance. Coefficient estimates in column 1 are marginal effects, evaluated at the mean. 
 
The results in Table 4.2 are consistent for most market entry costs across the two export 
margins: An increase in their values tends to increase the extensive margin decision, i.e. it 
stimulates the firms in our sample to engage in exports. However, once this decision has been 
made, almost none of the market entry costs affect the intensive margin decision. That is, the 
export volume decision is insensitive to changes in these factors. There are two exceptions to 
this story: First, and somewhat surprisingly, the number of documents required to import goods 
into a country does not have any effect on either of the two export margins. Second, the time it 
takes to import goods into a country has a negative effect on both export margins. This is not 
 
20 In their estimation, country size is subsumed in exporter and importer fixed effects so there are no explicit estimates.   38 
surprising. Firms’ exports to a particular destination normally consist of several deliveries. The 
number of days it takes to import and the number of needed documents are therefore 
presumably largely variable trade costs.  
Because most of these variables are indexes, it is hard to attach an economic interpretation 
to a one unit change in their values. Instead, it is more informative to consider the extremes of 
the distribution. Take for example voice & accountability. The coefficient estimates suggest that 
if Syria (with a value of -1.77) could improve its institutions in this regard to the level of 
Norway (with a value of 1.53), Dutch firms would be 4.6 percentage points more likely to 
export to Syria. Similarly, if Iran could improve the quality of its regulations to the level of 
Denmark, the probability of Dutch firms exporting to Iran would increase by 9.7 percentage 
points. A decrease in the extent of corruption in Bangladesh to the level of that in Finland 
would increase the export probability with 8 percentage points. Improving intellectual property 
rights protection in Guyana to the level of that in the United States would make exports to the 
former 10.2 percentage points more likely. Finally, if the number of days it takes to import 
goods into Rwanda would fall to the level of Denmark, this would increase the probability of 
Dutch firms exporting to Rwanda by 9 percentage points, whereas it would increase the export 
volume to Rwanda by 81%.
21  
The findings regarding the first five market entry costs in Table 4.2 are consistent with the 
notion that they are indeed largely fixed costs that firms have to overcome when entering a 
market. Once they have done so, these costs are unimportant for subsequent export volume 
decisions, as Chaney’s (2008) model predicts. It also implies that these costs might function as 
proper exclusion restrictions in the Heckman selection model that we employ.  
In order to test this conjecture, as well as to investigate the robustness of our results with 
respect to changing the component of the exclusion restriction, we rerun the regressions of 
Table 4.2 seven times, each time using a different market entry cost proxy as the exclusion 
restriction. Table 4.3 presents the results of this exercise: the rows in the table denote the impact 
of the different variables on the intensive and extensive margin of trade, whereas the columns 
depict the specific market entry cost proxy that is used as the exclusion restriction. A + denotes 
a significant positive effect, a - a significant negative effect, and a 0 an effect which is not 
statistically different from 0. Hence, the final column of Table 4.3 replicates the results of Table 
4.2, where cultural proximity was used as the exclusion restriction.  
The results in Table 4.3 suggest voice & accountability, the quality of regulation, the control 
of corruption, and cultural proximity as the best proxies of fixed export costs. They demonstrate 
the most consistent pattern of a significant effect on the extensive margin of trade, and no effect 
on the intensive margin of trade. Yet the results also reveal that some of the baseline estimates 
in Table 4.2 are relatively sensitive to the choice of the exclusion restriction. For example, the 
 
21 Recall that, as before, even though this latter effect is huge both by itself as well as compared to the extensive margin 
effect, the cross-country variation in the intensive margin is also substantially larger than that in the extensive margin. 
Specifically, these effects translate into a 0.22 standard deviation impact at the extensive margin, and a 0.28 standard 
deviation impact at the intensive margin.   39 
results on overall institutional quality fluctuate quite heavily between negative, positive and 
insignificant effects. On the other hand, the effect of intellectual property rights protection 
(IPR) appears to be consistently positive on both trade margins. In Table 4.2 the coefficient in 
the intensive margin equation was not significant. Weak patent regimes are significant barriers 
to manufacturing trade, particularly in goods that are sensitive to IPRs. Nevertheless, this 
phenomenon occurs mainly within industrialising economies that pose credible imitation 
threats.  Smith (1999) estimated that US exports to middle income countries with high imitation 
capabilities could increase substantially if global IPR standards are imposed. The results in 
Table 4.3 suggest that higher IPR not only induces new exporters to enter a market but that also 
existing trade relations intensify. Finally, the number of days to import goods appears to be a 
consistent determinant of both trade margins, as it shows up with a negative sign throughout 
almost all regressions. 
Table 4.3  Fixed costs analyses 
    VA  QR  IQ  CC  IPR  Docs  Days  CP 
    1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
                   
Ext    0  +  +  0  +  +  +  1. Voice &  
    accountability  Int    0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Ext  +    +  +  +  +  +  +  2. Quality of      
    regulation  Int  +    0  0  0  0  0  0 
Ext  0  –    0  0  +  0  +  3. Institutional    
    quality  Int  0  –    0  –  0  0  0 
Ext  +  0  +    +  +  +  +  4. Control of   
    corruption  Int  0  0  0    0  0  0  0 
Ext  +  +  +  +    +  +  +  5. Intellectual   
   property rights  Int  +  +  +  +    +  0  0 
Ext  0  0  –  0  0    0  0  6. Number of     
    documents  Int  –  0  –  –  0    0  0 
Ext  –  0  –  –  –  –    –  7. Number of  
    days  Int  –  –  –  –  –  –    – 
Ext  +  +  +  +  +  +  +    8. Cultural  
    proximity  Int  +  0  +  +  0  0  0   
                   
Notes: Rows depict the entry costs variables as entered to the baseline model. Columns depict the exclusion restriction chosen to 
estimate the Heckman selection model. A + indicates a significant positive effect, 0 an insignificant effect, and - a significant negative 
effect. 
 
4.4  Robustness analysis 
We perform a number of robustness checks to test the sensitivity of the baseline results as 
reported in Table 4.1  First, we include industry dummies in the two regressions models (4.1) 
and (4.2) to rule out that our results are driven by unobserved industry-level heterogeneity. 
Second, some concern might arise regarding our inclusion of wholesalers and retailers in the   40 
analysis, as they do not correspond well with the theoretical notion of a ‘producer’ in Chaney’s 
model (2008). Therefore, we rerun the analyses excluding these firms. Third, so far we have 
assumed that unobserved firm-level heterogeneity is not an issue, by estimating the extensive 
margin decision in (4.1) using pooled probit. This might be too restrictive: we repeat our 
analyses, now employing a Random Effects (RE) probit estimator. Finally, even though we 
have tried to follow the theoretical model as closely as possible, it might be the case that 
productivity is actually measuring some other firm characteristic. Therefore, we add to the 
analyses the firm size-class (ranging from 0-9), and a variable indicating whether a firm is a 
multinational (1) or not (0). Table 4.4 presents the results. 
 
Table 4.4  Robustness analyses 
     Industry dummies  Excl. wholesale/retail    RE probit model  Additional firm controls 
  Extensive  Intensive  Extensive  Intensive  Extensive  Intensive  Extensive  Intensive 
                 
















































































Cultural proximity  0.001*** 
(.000) 
  0.002*** 
(.000) 
  0.004*** 
(.000) 
  0.001*** 
(.000) 
 








Lambda    1.92*** 
(.462) 
  1.96*** 
(.490) 
  0.506*** 
(.118) 
  2.37*** 
(.454) 
                 
(Pseudo) R
2  0.25  0.25  0.20  0.23  -  0.21  0.23  0.24 
P_actual  0.21  -  0.26  -  0.21  -  0.21  - 
P_predict  0.14  -  0.21  -  0.11  -  0.15  - 
No. observations  156,708  32,515  90,720  23,194  156,708  32,515  156,708  32,515 
Log Likelihood          – 52,167       
ρ          0.93       
σu          3.52       
 
Source: own estimations based on Statistics Netherlands data. Cluster-robust standard errors within parentheses. Standard errors in RE 
probit model are not corrected for clustering. ***, ** and * denotes 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance. Coefficient estimates in 
column 1 are marginal effects, evaluated at the mean. 
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First consider the first two columns where industry dummies are included in the analysis (the 
coefficient estimates of these dummies are not reported for reasons of space). The most notable 
difference with respect to the baseline estimates is that the coefficient on productivity drops for 
the extensive and intensive margin. This indicates that a part of the impact of productivity on 
the margins of exports should in fact be attributed to unobserved sectoral heterogeneity. That is, 
some industries are more likely to export than others: if there are also inter-industry differences 
in average firm-productivity, this industry effect is mistakenly interpreted as a productivity 
effect.  
The next two columns in Table 4.4 present the estimates excluding wholesalers and retailers 
from the analysis. The most notable difference compared to the baseline estimates is the effect 
of productivity which drops again, although not as much as before. This drop is especially 
salient in the extensive margin regression. Productivity appears to be a particular prominent 
determinant of the extensive margin export decision for trade specialists.
22 Further note that the 
coefficient on distance in the extensive margin regression slightly increases in absolute value. 
This implies that on average, distance is a stronger impediment to engage in exports for non-
trade specialists. Cultural proximity is also a more important determinant of establishing trade 
relations for purely manufacturing firms. The coefficient is higher than in the sample with 
wholesale and retail firms suggesting, that cultural differences are a minor barrier for firms 
specialized in trading. 
The results on the extensive margin (in column (5)) change quite substantially when the 
extensive margin regression is estimated assuming random firm effects. In particular, the impact 
of all determinants on the extensive margin decision increases. Additionally, the impact of 
remoteness takes an unexpected negative and significant sign in both regressions. These results 
might be taken to suggest that ignoring firm-heterogeneity in the pooled model is unwarranted, 
and that taking account of this heterogeneity in the RE model leads to much larger impacts of 
the trade determinants. On the other hand, the results on remoteness are surprising and not 
consistent with the theory. However, because of our inability to correct for clustering of firms at 
the country-level when using the RE probit model, the estimated t-statistics are extremely high 
in all cases. This could imply that the significance of remoteness is spurious, but a similar 
argument holds for the other variables as well.  
Finally, adding additional firm-level control variables leaves the baseline results essentially 
intact, although in this case, the estimated productivity effects increase somewhat. The results 
on size class and MNE show that larger firms and firms that are (part of) a multinational are 
more likely to engage in trade, and on average display larger trade volumes. These results 
accord with Kox and Rojas-Romagosa (2010), who only consider the overall export-decision of 
a different panel of Dutch firms. 
 
 
22 However, also note that our measure of labour productivity is not likely to be a very suitable productivity proxy for 
wholesale and retail firms.   42 
4.5  Market size matters 
The impact of variable and fixed trade costs on the extensive and intensive margins of trade 
might differ, depending on the ease with which consumers switch between the suppliers of 
goods (varieties) in their consumption basket. Specifically, if the elasticity of substitution is low 
(i.e. consumers do not easily switch between suppliers of goods) the model predicts that trade 
costs will have a large impact on the decision to export or not, and a small impact on the export 
volume decision. Conversely, if the elasticity of substitution is high (i.e. consumers easily 
switch between suppliers of goods) trade costs have a small impact on the extensive margin of 
exports, and a large impact on the intensive margin. 
The intuition is as follows: if the elasticity of substitution is low, relatively large price (and 
hence cost and productivity) differences between firms can be sustained, since consumers do 
not switch easily between producers. A reduction of trade costs, and hence a reduction in the 
export productivity threshold ϕE in Figure 2.1 will then induce a relatively large influx of new 
exporters. The fact that these new entrants are substantially less productive than the average 
exporter is of little consequence, due to the low elasticity of substitution. At the same time, the 
export volumes of exporters can only increase marginally, as the market has to be shared with a 
substantially larger amount of firms. 
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If the elasticity of substitution is high, this situation is turned around. In this case, large price 
(and hence productivity) differences between firms cannot be sustained, because consumers 
easily switch from high-cost to low-cost producers. Therefore, a reduction in trade costs will not 
induce many firms to enter the market because many of them are insufficiently productive to 
compete with the incumbent high-productivity exporters. At the same time, the reduction in 
(variable) trade costs allows the incumbent producers to charge lower prices, hence inducing a 
relatively large increase in the export volumes of individual producers.
23 
Even though we have no explicit measure of the elasticity of substitution in the different 
export markets, we do have information on the dispersion of exporters’ productivity around the 
mean for each export destination. Syverson (2004) suggests that if the elasticity of substitution 
is high, the dispersion of productivity is expected to decrease. Figure 4.1 displays the 
relationship between the dispersion of exporter productivity (weighted by Value Added) and 
total GDP for 106 export destinations in our sample. Dispersion is measured by the Interquartile 
Range (IQR) rather than the standard deviation to minimize the influence of outliers in the 
productivity distribution (cf. Syverson, 2004).  
Table 4.5  Large versus small countries 
                  Large countries                  Small countries 
  Extensive  Intensive  Extensive  Intensive 
         








































Cultural proximity  0.002*** 
(.000) 
   0.004*** 
(.000) 
  
Lambda    3.06*** 
(1.18) 
  – 0.179 
(.487) 
         
(Pseudo) R
2  0.10  0.17  0.11  0.05 
P_actual  0.33  -  0.08  - 
P_predict  0.32  -  0.06  - 
No. observations  78,384  25,894  78,324  6,621 
 
Source: own estimations based on Statistics Netherlands data. Large countries are those with above median total GDP, small countries 
are those with below median total GDP. Cluster-robust standard errors within parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes 1%, 5% and 10% 
statistical significance. All reported coefficients are computed as the ratio of the estimated elasticity over the standard deviation of the 
dependent variable. 
 
23 Recall from the discussion in Section 2 that only variable trade costs have an impact on the intensive margin.   44 
The figure shows that exporter productivity dispersion decreases with the size of the market. 
This is consistent with the notion that larger markets are more competitive (Melitz and 
Ottaviano, 2008) and that the elasticity of substitution increases with market size (Krugman, 
1979). We consequently should expect trade costs to have a larger impact on the intensive 
margin in large countries, and on the extensive margin in small countries. Table 4.5 below tests 
this result by splitting our sample into two groups, one for large countries and one for small 
countries, where large countries are those with total GDP above the sample median. The 
coefficient estimates are expressed as the ratio of the estimated elasticity over the standard 
deviation of the dependent variable, to enhance comparison between the extensive and intensive 
export margins. 
First, consider the first two columns regarding export margins for large export destinations. 
The estimates show that each of the variables has a consistently larger impact on the intensive 
margin than on the extensive margin. This holds in particular for the intensive margin effects of 
distance and tariffs, which exceed those on the extensive margin by a factor 2 and 3 
respectively. For the small country sample, the results for distance are indeed reversed, 
although less strong: Here the impact of distance is somewhat stronger on the extensive margin 
than on the intensive margin. Moreover, surprisingly tariffs enter the extensive margin 
regression with a positive sign, as result which we find difficult to explain. Taken together, 
these results are consistent with the notion that large markets are more competitive, and that as 
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5  Conclusions 
This paper investigates to what extent the current export pattern of large Dutch firms can be 
explained by current patterns of firm-level productivity and cross country differences in size, 
trade and transport costs, and several proxies of market entry costs. Specifically, we have 
investigated to what extent these factors affect both the export decision (the extensive margin of 
exports) and the export volume decision (the intensive margin of exports). 
Our results demonstrate economically sizeable effects of these factors on both export 
margins. Specifically, we find that a 10% increase in productivity, country size and distance (as 
a proxy for transport costs) increase the probability that Dutch firms export to a particular 
country by 0.4, 1.1 and -1.7 percentage points respectively. For already established exporters, 
similar increases in these variables induce a 6.7%, 17% and –25% increase in export volumes. 
Furthermore, there is an additional effect of trade tariffs on export volumes: Decreasing tariffs 
by 1% increases the export volume by 3.8%.  
Our empirical methodology has allowed us to uncover some explicit aspects of market entry 
costs, i.e. trade barriers or costs that only affect the export decision but not the subsequent 
export volume decision. Specifically, we find that in particular the level of democracy, the 
quality of regulations and the extent of corruption in foreign countries are important 
impediments to trade for Dutch firms. For example, if Syria improves its institutions governing 
the quality of its democracy to the level of Norway, it would increase the export probability of 
Dutch firms with 4.6 percentage points. Similarly, if Iran would get the quality of its regulation 
on par with that in Denmark, Dutch firms would be 9.7 percentage points more likely to export 
to Iran. Finally, if Bangladesh would be able to reduce corruption to similar levels as in Finland, 
Dutch firms would be 8 percentage points more probable to export there. Both by themselves 
and compared to the impact of country size, transport and trade costs, these effects are large. 
Finally, we provide some tentative evidence that the responsiveness of export and export 
volume decisions to changes in trade barriers differs between large and small export 
destinations. In particular, it appears that for large countries, export volume decisions are two to 
three times as responsive to transport and trade costs than export decisions. On the contrary, in 
small countries export decisions respond to somewhat more to such changes than export volume 
decision. 
These results have a number of policy implications. First, “promoting exports” by itself is an 
ambivalent policy goal. In order to design more effective policy instruments, the aims of such 
instruments should be made more much explicit. That is, is the goal of export promotion to 
stimulate firms to engage in exports, or to stimulate existing exporters to increase their export 
volumes? If the latter is the goal, it should then be made explicit whether export volumes should 
be increased by intensifying already existing trade relationships, or by establishing new ones in 
so far uncharted territory.    46 
Second, once the goals have been made explicit, it then should be recognized that the 
appropriateness of policy instruments will depend on the nature of these goals. Our results 
indicate that decreasing trade and transport costs are particularly effective to intensify existing 
trade relationships. However, in order to stimulate firms to engage in exports or exporters to 
expand their export destination portfolio, it is more appropriate to lower market entry costs, as 
they are more important impediments to the export decision than trade and transport costs. 
The question then arises how market entry costs can be lowered? This touches upon a third 
implication, which is that especially for Dutch firms which already perform relatively well on 
international markets, traditional trade policies aimed at lowering tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
are less effective in helping trade potential to materialize. Instead, other policies, such as trade 
missions, policies to lower information costs about foreign markets, bilateral negotiations and 
political diplomacy, may have a larger impact by unlocking export markets that are so far 
largely isolated for Dutch firms. This is not only a matter of establishing business networks and 
infrastructure for doing business; it also entails pressing for institutional and regulatory reforms 
that make it less risky for Dutch firms to start doing business in foreign countries that now 
provide business opportunities that are too uncertain. 
Finally, our results suggest that being sufficiently productive is a prerequisite to survive in 
foreign markets. Winners need not be picked, they will select themselves. Targeted policies 
might temporarily soften the budget constraints of firms that are otherwise incapable of 
exporting. However, to the extent that such policies cannot be sustained long enough to allow 
firms to reach sufficient scale and productivity, they are not likely to generate long term large 
gains. A similar argument extends to promoting exports to specific (developing) countries: As 
long as the proper institutional and regulatory conditions for doing business are absent, any 
temporary export promotion policies targeting specific countries is not likely to lead to 
sustained welfare gains. In short, if targeted export promotion policies are to be successful, they 
will have to be maintained long enough either for firms to become productive enough to sustain 
themselves abroad, or for a foreign country to develop an institutional framework that will 
establish its position as an attractive place for doing business.  
We close by pointing out some limitations in this study. First and foremost, we have focused 
on large firms only. Since these firms can be expected to experience lower trade barriers than 
small firms, our estimates are possibly conservative, i.e. they provide a lower bound regarding 
the impact of trade barriers on the export decision. More research in a similar vein as ours that 
also (or mainly) includes small firms would be helpful in finding a proper range of these 
impacts. Second, our sample only covers two years of data, which implies that we derive 
essentially all our variation from the cross-section dimension. Having a longer time-frame 
would allow investigating the impact of specific events that likely affect export decisions, such 
as the EU enlargement in 2004 or the global crisis in 2008. These types of events could have a 
significant effect on trade costs which could work out differently for the extensive and intensive 
margin.    47 
References 
Akerman, A. and R. Forslid, 2009, Firm heterogeneity and country size dependent market entry 
costs, Hi-Stat Discussion Paper 056, Hitotsubashi University Japan. 
 
Anderson, J.E., and D. Marcouiller, 2002, Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: an Empirical 
Investigation, Review of Economics and Statistics 84, p 342-352. 
 
Anderson, J.E. and E. van Wincoop, 2003, Gravity with gravitas: A solution to the border 
puzzle, American Economic Review 93(1), p 170-192.  
 
Baldwin, J.R. and W. Gu, 2003, Export market participation and productivity performance in 
Canadian manufacturing, Canadian Journal of Economics 36, p 634-657. 
 
Bernard, A.B. and J.B. Jensen, 1999, Exceptional exporters performance: cause, effect, or both? 
Journal of International Economics 47, p 1-15. 
 
Bernard, A.B. and J.B. Jensen, 2004, Why some firms export, Review of Economics and 
Statistics 86(2), p 561-569. 
 
Bernard, A.B., J. Eaton, J. B. Jensen and S.S. Kortum, 2003, Plants and productivity in 
international trade, American Economic Review 93(4), p 1268-1290. 
 
Bernard, A.B., J. B. Jensen, S.J. Redding and P.K. Schott, 2007, Firms in international trade, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(3), p 105-130. 
 
Bernard, A.B., J. B. Jensen, S.J. Redding and P.K. Schott, 2010, Wholesalers and retailers in 
U.S. trade, AEA Papers and Proceedings, forthcoming. 
 
Blalock, G. and P.J. Gertler, 2004, Learning from exporting revisited in a less developed 
setting, Journal of Development Economics 75, p 397-416. 
 
Blanes-Cristóbal, J.V., M. Dovis, J. Milgram-Baleix and A.I. Moro-Egido, 2008, Do sunk 
exporting costs differ among markets? Evidence from Spanish manufacturing firms, Economics 
Letters 101(2), p 110-112. 
 
Chaney, T., 2008, Distorted gravity: The intensive and extensive margins of international trade, 
American Economic Review 98(4), p 1707-1721. 
   48 
Chevassus-Lozza, E. and K. Latouche, 2009, Heterogeneity of firms, heterogeneity of markets 
and trade costs: access of French exporters to European agri-food markets, Mimeo. 
Crozet, M., and P. Koenig, 2010, Structural gravity equations with intensive and extensive margins, 
Canadian Journal of Economics 43(1), p. 41-62. 
 
Crozet, M., P. Koenig and V. Rebeyrol, 2008, Exporting to insecure markets – a firm-level analysis, 
CEPII Working Paper 2008-13 (September), Paris. 
 
De Groot, H. de, G. Linders, P. Rietveld and U. Subramanian , 2004, The institutional determinants 
of bilateral trade patterns, Kyklos 57(1), p 103-123. 
De  Loecker,  J.,  2007,  Do  exports  generate  higher  productivity?  Evidence  from  Slovenia, 
Journal of International Economics 74(1), p 69-98. 
 
Djankov,  S.,  C.  Freund  and  C.S.  Pham,  2010, Trading  on  time,  Review  of  Economics  and 
Statistics 92(1), p 166-173. 
 
Eaton, J., S. Kortum and F. Kramarz, 2004, Dissecting trade: Firms, industries and export 
destinations, AEA Papers and Proceedings 94(2), p 150-154. 
 
Eaton, J., S. Kortum and F. Kramarz, 2008, An anatomy of international trade: Evidence from 
French firms, NBER Working Paper 14610. 
 
Ginarte, J.C. and W.G. Park, 1997, Determinants of patent rights: A cross-national study, 
Research Policy 26(3), p 283-301. 
 
Greenaway, D. and R. Kneller, 2007, Firm heterogeneity, exporting and Foreign Direct 
Investment, The Economic Journal 117, p F134-F161. 
 
Guiso L., P. Sapienza, and L. Zingales, 2009, Cultural biases in economic exchange, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 124(3), p 1095-1131. 
  
Gwarntey and Lawson, 2008, Economic Freedom of the World: 2008 annual report. 
 
Hahn, C.H., 2004, Exporting and performance of plants: evidence from Korean manufacturing, 
NBER Working Paper 10189. 
   49 
Heckman, J.J., 1979, Sample selection bias as a specification error, Econometrica 47(1), p 153-
161. 
 
Helpman, E., Melitz, M. and Rubinstein, Y., 2008, Estimating trade flows: Trading partners and 
trading volumes, Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, p 441-487. 
 
Heritage Foundation, 2009, Index of Economic Freedom 2010, http://www.heritage.org/Index/. 
 
Isgut, A., 2001, What’s different about exporters? Evidence from Colombian manufacturing, 
Journal of Development Studies 37, p 57-82. 
 
Kaufman, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, 2009, Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and 
Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2008, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
4978, Washington. 
 
Kaufmann, D. and S.J. Wei, 1999, Does ‘Grease’ Money Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?, 
NBER Working Paper 7093. 
Kneller, R. & M. Pisu, 2007, Export barriers: What are they and who do they matter to?, GEP 
Research paper 2007/12, University of Nottingham, Nottingham. 
 
KOF institute, 2009, KOF Globalisation index, 
http://www.globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/method_2009.pdf. 
Kox, H and H. Rojas-Romagosa, 2010, Exports and productivity selection effects for Dutch 
firms, CPB Discussion Paper 143, The Hague. 
 
Krugman, P.R., 1979, Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and international trade, 
Journal of International Economics 9(4), p 469-479. 
 
Lawless, M., 2009, Firm export dynamics and the geography of trade, Journal of International 
Economics 77(2), p 245-254. 
 
Linders, G-J, 2006, Intangible Barriers to Trade: the impact of institutions, culture and distance 
on patterns of trade, Tinbergen Institute Research Series. 
 
Mayer, T. and G. Ottaviano, 2007, The happy few: new facts on the internationalisation of 
European firms, Bruegel-CEPF EFIM report, Bruegel Blueprint Series. 
   50 
Melitz, M.J., 2003, The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry-
productivity, Econometrica 71(6), p 1695-1725. 
 
Melitz, M.J. and G.I.P. Ottaviano, 2008, Market size, trade and productivity, Review of 
Economic Studies 75(1), p 295-316. 
 
Musila, J.W. and S.P. Sigué, 2010, Corruption and International Trade: An Empirical 
Investigation of African Countries, The World Economy 33, p 129-146. 
 
Roberts, M. and J. Tybout, 1997, The decision to export in Colombia: An empirical model of 
entry with sunk costs, American Economic Review 87(4), p 545-564. 
 
Smith, P., 1999, Are weak patent rights a barrier to US exports?, Journal of International 
Economics 48, p 151-177. 
 
Syverson, C., 2004, Market structure and productivity: A concrete example, Journal of Political 
Economy 112(6), p 1181-1223.  
 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS), 2009, Internationalisation Monitor 2009. 
 
Van Biesebroeck, J., 2005, Exporting raises productivity in sub-Saharan African manufacturing 
plants, Journal of International Economics 67(2), p 373-391. 
 
Wagner, J., 2007, Exports and productivity: a survey of the evidence from firm level data, The 
World Economy, 30 (10), p 60-82. 
 
Wooldridge, J.M., 2002, Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data, Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
 
World Bank, 2009, Doing Business Indicators, http://www.doingbusiness.org/. 
 




   51 
Appendix 1: Theoretical model 
Consider a world with M potentially asymmetric countries, where firms produce goods using 
labour L as the sole production factor. Consumers in each country maximize utility. There is 
one homogenous goods sector (good 0) and a sector h with a continuous set  h Ω of 
differentiated varieties. Utility is modelled in a two-tier utility function: the first Cobb-Douglas 
tier models the substitution of consumption (q) between both sectors with substitution 
parameter µ, and the second CES tier models the substitution between the different varieties ω 
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where  0 1 h µ µ + =  . Consumers in country j earn income Yj of which a part µh is spent on 
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where r denotes country, n is the number of firms, and p is the price. Total expenditure on good 
h in country j is thus given by 
h
h j j Y P µ . Applying Shephard’s lemma to the price index in (A.2) 
yields individual demand for a variety of good h, supplied by firms from country r to consumers 
in country j: 
1 h
h h h
rj h jr j j q p Y P
σ σ µ
− − = . 
The homogenous good functions as the numeraire: it is freely traded and produced under 
constant returns to scale using one unit of labour, thus producing wm units of good 0 where wm 
is country m’s wage rate. Trading the differentiated goods is costly in two ways: first, producers 
incur a variable “iceberg” trade cost 
h
jk τ when shipping good h from country j to country k. 
These costs entail all variable trade costs, such as tariffs and transport costs. Second, producers 
incur a fixed export cost
h
jk F . These fixed export costs are of key interest in this study.  
Producers or firms are heterogeneous in terms of labour productivity. Each firm i draws a 
random unit of labour productivity ϕi, which has a cumulative distribution function of G(ϕ). 
Hence, firm i based in country j and supplying to consumers in country k maximizes the 
following profit function with respect to prices: 
h
j jk h h h h
ijk ijk kj kj jk h
i
w
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Substituting demand into (A.3) and optimizing yields the optimal price as a constant mark-up 
over marginal costs, which is reminiscent of the familiar Dixit-Stiglitz price, with the difference 
that more productive firms (higher ϕi) can charge lower prices: 
1
h
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rj ϕ denotes the minimum productivity level necessary for firms from country r to be able 
to profitable export to country j. Its value is derived explicitly below.   
In order to analytically solve the model, it is assumed that productivity shocks are Pareto 
distributed with shape parameter γh, over [1, ∞): 
 
( ) ( ) 1
h h
h P G
γ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
− < = = − ɶ   (A.6) 
where γh > σh - 1. γ is a measure of sector heterogeneity: the smaller is γ, the more 
heterogeneous is a sector. Using the optimal price from (A.4) in the demand function, and 
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Putting these profits to 0 and rearranging the equation yields the productivity threshold above 
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where λ1 is a constant.
24 Using this formulation for the cut-off level of productivity, together 
with the assumption Pareto distributed productivity draws in (A.6) allows us to write the perfect 
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where λ2 is again a constant
25, and θk is similar to Anderson and Van Wincoop’s (2003) 
multilateral resistance index. Essentially, it captures the remoteness of a country with respect to 
all its trading partners (including itself). In contrast to earlier specifications, this index also 
weights multilateral resistance by fixed export costs. Note that we have ignored the different 
varieties of goods and effectively assumed one variety in deriving equation (A.9) by skipping 
the index h. The reason is that we do not distinguish different industries in our empirical 
analysis. We will drop the index h from this point forward. 
Finally, substituting (A.9) back into the productivity threshold of (A.8) gives the equilibrium 
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  (A.10) 
where λ4 is a constant. (A.10) will serve as the basis for estimating the extensive export margin 
decision. Conditional on a positive export decision, exports from firm i based in country j to 
country k are derived by substituting the price index (A.9) and the equilibrium price (A.4) into 
the equation for export values: 
( 1) ( 1)/
1
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0 if 
k k
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  (A.11) 
Equation (A.11) is the basis for estimating the intensive export margin.  
 
25 See Chaney (2008) p. 1713 for the exact definition of this and subsequently introduced constant terms.   54 
Appendix 2: Econometric model 
The theoretical model briefly discussed in Section 2 and presented in Appendix 1 establishes 
the productivity threshold (A.10) facing firms from home country j that wish to export to 
country k, as well as the amount of exports (A.11) once this threshold has been taken. These 
two equations form the underpinning of our estimations. In this Appendix we will demonstrate 
that they naturally lead to the derivation of a Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979). 
Note that if a firm’s productivity is at least as high as the threshold in (A.10), it will serve 
market k. Otherwise, it will not export its products to this market. In other words, firm i from 
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  (B.1) 
We can now construct a latent variable 
*
ijk Exp  which is the difference between the (log-
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  (B.2) 
From above it follows that firm i will export to country k if 
*
ijk Exp  ≥ 0. Hence, if we construct 
a binary variable  [0,1] ijk Exp ∈  where a value of 0 indicates no exports by firm i from country 
j to country k and a value of 1 indicates positive exports, we can establish the following 
relationship between this binary variable and our latent variable: 
*
*
1 if  0







  (B.3) 
Since we have only one home country j in our sample (the Netherlands) and two years of 
observations, we drop subscript j and add a subscript t. We further assume that the error term ε 
in (B.2) is a linear composite of unobserved firm (η), country (φ) and time (ν) heterogeneity, as 
well as an idiosyncratic component (υ), i.e.: 
ikt i k t ikt ε η φ ν υ = + + +   (B.4)  
where we assume that υ follows a standard normal distribution and that it is independent of all 
the other variables on the right hand side of (B.2), as well as the other terms in (B.4). Then the 
probability of a positive export decision is given by:    55 
3
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 
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(B.5) 
where Φ denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution and where the second equality on 
the first line of (B.5) follows from the symmetry of this distribution around its mean. This is a 
Probit binary choice model that can be estimated empirically from our dataset: 
( ) 0 ikt it y kt Y t w t kt kt F k i k t Exp y y w F ϕ τ θ α α ϕ α α α α τ α θ α η φ ν = Φ + + + + + + + + + +   (B.6) 
We have replaced the structural coefficients in (B.5) with α’s as we do not intend to structurally 
estimate the model (cf. Crozet and Koenig, 2010). Also note that the constant term λ3 has been 
replaced by β0 and that we have omitted the ln transformation for ease of notation. As further 
explained in Section 4.1, this model is estimated by means of a pooled estimator, without 
country specific effects. In the robustness test (see Section 4.4) we also review the case in 
which ηi is randomly distributed (the Random Effects estimator). 
Conditional on a positive export decision (i.e. 
*
ijk Exp =1), firms then decide how much to 
export to country k at time t. Using (A.11) and log-linearizing both sides (again omitting the ln 
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26 As before, we have replaced the structural coefficients with β’s to stress we do not aim to structurally estimate the model.   56 
where we have used (X’β) to substitute for the RHS of (B.2), φ denotes the normal marginal 
distribution, and as before Φ denotes the cumulative normal distribution.  
The expression following the second equality in (B.8) follows from a common assumption 
on the joint distribution of the error terms in (B.2) and (B.7), which is a bivariate normal one 
with zero expectation, variances 
2
υ σ  and 
2
ξ σ  respectively, and covariance  υξ σ . For two 
normal random variables, it holds that 
2 ( | ) ( / ) E υξ ξ ξ υ σ σ υ = . The expression following the 
third equality follows both from a normalization of 
2
ξ σ  to 1 as well as the expression for a 
truncated standard normal distribution.  
The final element in the final expression on the RHS in (B.8) demonstrates that the intensive 
margin decision is indeed affected by the extensive margin decision. This element - the ratio of 
the marginal normal distribution over the cumulative normal distribution - is also known as the 
inverse Mill’s ratio, or alternatively, as Heckman’s lambda (Heckman, 1979). Specifically, it 
shows that if the two error terms of the extensive and intensive margin decisions are correlated, 
we should expect to find a significant coefficient estimate for Heckman’s lambda (i.e. a 
significant estimate of  υξ σ ). The reason is that there might be unobserved heterogeneity or 
idiosyncratic shocks that simultaneously affect the decision to export and the export volume 
decision. It also means that in order to properly estimate the intensive margin decision’s 
coefficients, we should include an estimate of Heckman’s lambda - derived from the extensive 
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  (B.9) 
where λ is Heckman’s lambda and its coefficient captures the covariance between the extensive 
and intensive margin decision.  
To enhance identification of the β’s, it is often recommended to specify an exclusion 
restriction i.e. to include a variable in (B.6) which is not included in (B.9). This is especially 
convenient if the explanatory variables in the two models largely overlap (as they do in this 
case) and if Heckman’s lambda is close to being linear. As can be seen by comparing (A.10) 
and (A.11) or (B.6) and (B.9), our model suggests a natural candidate for such an exclusion 
restriction: fixed export costs. It is this aspect of the model and its econometric implication that 
we exploit in the main analysis.    57 
Appendix 3: Country table 
Table A.1  Country sample 
Albania  Ecuador  Kenya  Portugal 
Algeria  Egypt  Kyrgyzstan  Russia 
Argentina  El Salvador  Latvia  Rwanda 
Australia  Estonia  Lithuania  Senegal 
Austria  Fiji  Luxembourg  Slovak Republic 
Azerbaijan  Finland  Madagascar  Slovenia 
Bangladesh  France  Malawi  South Africa 
Belgium  Gabon  Malaysia  South Korea 
Belize  Georgia  Mali  Spain 
Benin  Germany  Malta  Sri Lanka 
Bolivia  Ghana  Mauritius  Sweden 
Botswana  Greece  Mexico  Switzerland 
Brazil  Guatamala  Mexico  Syria 
Bulgaria  Guyana  Morocco  Thailand 
Burundi  Honduras  Namibia  Togo 
Cameroon  Hungary  Nepal  Trinidad and Tobago 
Canada  Iceland  New Zealand  Tunesia 
Central African Republic  India  Nicaragua  Turkey 
Chile  Indonesia  Niger  Uganda 
China  Iran  Nigeria  Ukraine 
Colombia  Ireland  Norway  United Kingdom 
Costa Rica  Israel  Pakistan  United States 
Croatia  Italy  Panama  Uruguay 
Cyprus  Ivory Coast  Paraguay  Venezuela 
Czech Republic  Jamica  Peru  Zambia 
Denmark  Japan  Philippines   
Dominican Republic  Jordan  Poland   
       
Notes: Countries in bold are part of the large country sample 
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